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Summary
Research has attempted to explain perceived cues to deception based upon self-report
of what participants believe are ‘good’ cues to deception, or self-report ofwhat cues par-
ticipants say they base their veracity judgements on. However, it is not clear to what
extent participants can accurately self-report what influences their decision-making.
Using a within-subjects design, 285 participants completed a questionnaire regarding
their beliefs about deception before rating a selection of truthful and deceptive state-
ments on a variety of cues. Expert coders also rated the statements for the same cues.
Laypeople and expert coders do not conceptualise between-subject consistency in the
sameway. A lensmodel showed thatwhilst perceptions of cues, such as consistency and
amount of detail, influence veracity judgements, these perceptions (and overall veracity
judgements) are mostly inaccurate. Fundamentally, there seems to be inconsistencies
between how deception research examines consistency and how it is understood and
used by laypeople.
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The ‘consistency heuristic’ is the belief that consistency indicates
truthfulness and inconsistency indicates deception (Granhag &
Strömwall, 1999). The consistency heuristic is used to inform veracity
judgements when examining multiple interviewees' statements
(Strömwall, Granhag, & Jonsson, 2003), when examining the consis-
tency within statements (Reinhard, Greifeneder, & Scharmach, 2013),
and when comparing interviewee statements to evidence (Hartwig,
Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005). The consistency heuristic has been
mostly examined in relation to multiple statements taken from the
same individual (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000; Masip et al., 2018; Strö-
mwall & Granhag, 2003). To date there is little research examining
whether people actually use the consistency heuristic when making
veracity judgements across multiple statements, or whether they sim-
ply report it as a perceived cue to deception.
Research has shown the consistency heuristic does not reflect
actual truth teller and liar behaviour, as there is little difference
between truth teller and liar consistency (Vredeveldt, van Koppen, &
Granhag, 2014). As such, consistency is an unreliable cue. In this study,
we address three main research questions. First, we examine whether
laypeople assess the between-statement consistency of statements in
the sameway that researchers do. Second, we establishwhether partic-
ipants' perceptions of between-statement consistency inform their
veracity judgements, and whether these perceptions of between-
statement consistency are accurate in classifying statement veracity.
Finally, we explore whether participants actually use the cues they
report as being important in their veracity decision-making process.
One of the most commonly reported verbal cues to deception is
between-statement (in)consistency (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000, 2001);
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reported by both laypeople (Krix, Sauerland, Lorei, & Rispens, 2015) and
legal professionals (Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). When examining the
perceptions of the deception-consistency relationship amongst
uninformed laypeople and investigators, Masip et al. (2018) found that
uninformed laypeople who were asked to make veracity judgements on
a series of written statements most commonly reported (90%) utilising
(in)consistency to assist inmaking their judgement.
Researchers establish consistency using four main components;
repetitions, omissions, reminiscences and contradictions (Fisher,
Vrij, & Leins, 2013). The presence of repetitions increase between-
statement consistency, whereas omissions, reminiscences and con-
tradictions decrease between-statement consistency. Yet memory
research suggests that some types of inconsistency, such as reminis-
cences and omissions, are common features of memory reports
(Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Strange,
Dysart, & Loftus, 2015).
The general belief in the ‘consistency heuristic’, as reported by
both laypeople and practitioners, is that between-statement consis-
tency implies honesty and accuracy, and that any inconsistencies are
indicative of deception or inaccurate answers (Strömwall &
Granhag, 2003). However, when considering multiple statements from
the same individual, the consistency heuristic is incongruent with both
theoretical and empirical memory and deception research, which to
date has shown there is little difference between the consistency of
liars and truth tellers (Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Even when differences
do occur, the evidence suggests that consistency is more indicative of
deception, rather than honesty (Vredeveldt et al., 2014).
Whilst there is a large body of research showing that people gen-
erally agree how the consistency heuristic should be used, identifying
consistency in a series of consecutive statements is still idiosyncratic.
Granhag and Strömwall (2000) asked participants to act as lie detec-
tors and rate a series of three videos of the same suspect interrogated
on three separate occasions. When the subjective cues reported as
justification for participants' veracity-judgements were examined,
consistency was the most commonly reported cue. Of 125 partici-
pants, 78 reported using the consistency heuristic in making their
veracity judgement. However, 38 of these participants reported that
they considered the three consecutive statements consistent over
time, whereas the other 40 participants reported that the statements
were inconsistent over time. Thus, the exact same series of consecu-
tive statements were considered consistent by one judge, and incon-
sistent by another. Although people seem to agree that the
consistency heuristic is a good cue to deception, they display little
agreement as whether a set of statements are consistent or not.
Given these discrepant findings, it seems that whether a series of
statements are perceived as consistent or not is moderated by the
individual factors pertaining to the judge. It has been suggested that
personality traits underpin deception production abilities, and as such
should in turn affect lie detection abilities (Semrad, Scott-Parker, &
Nagel, 2019). Previous research is contrasting, with lie production
skills having been found to facilitate lie detection abilities (Wright,
Berry, & Bird, 2012; Wright, Berry, Catmur, & Bird, 2015), and also to
have no effect (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Levine, 2016).
Previous meta-analyses have found no relationship between indi-
vidual differences and accuracy in judging deception, however, the
studies included in the meta-analyses did not have adequate sample
sizes to explore the relationship between personality dimensions and
accuracy in veracity judgements (Aamodt & Custer, 2006). The major-
ity of past research has used samples of N ≤ 75, however, correlations
required to determine meaningful relationships stabilise at N > 250
(Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). A recent study with a sample of
207 participants found that dark and maladaptive personality traits
(captured in the honesty-humility domain) were associated with
judgemental biases, however, did not relate to the ability to detect
deception (Wissing & Reinhard, 2017). Honesty-humility traits
(e.g., sincerity, fairness) may influence someone to be more likely to
consider statements as truthful, whereas social skills may make a per-
son more socially discerning. Therefore, there is a need for adequately
powered research to examine personality traits and individual lie
detection abilities.
To date, researchers have attempted to examine subjective cues
to deception based on self-report (see meta-analysis by Hartwig &
Bond Jr, 2011). Self-reports usually takes the form of open-ended
questions about what participants believe are good cues to deception
or what cues they base their veracity judgements on. There is a meth-
odological limitation to this approach, as there is no way to establish
that the cues people report using are actually the ones that best
explain their decision-making process. It is possible due to low cue
validity, people are unaware of what drives their veracity judgements,
and when asked about it choose to report explicit social stereotypes
about deceptive behaviour.
One approach to address this question it to use lens modelling.
The lens model (Brunswik, 1952) was designed to examine the extent
to which perception is influenced by differing cues available in a stim-
ulus. Fiedler and Walka (1993) used lens modelling techniques to
explore the contribution of common cues (e.g., head movements, smil-
ing, speech rate) on judgments of deception. They demonstrated how
certain perceived cues predicted lie condition and subjective evalua-
tion when participants were informed about how to interpret the cues
and given feedback.
A lens model meta-analysis by Hartwig and Bond Jr (2011)
summarised (i) the relationship between non-verbal and verbal cues
created by deception and (ii) how the non-verbal and verbal cues
influenced perceptions of deception, to assess which behaviours were
enabling accurate judgments of deception. Through the examination
of 81 distinct judgement cues, it was found that individuals often
based their veracity judgements on cues that were not indicative of
deception. Furthermore, the cues that participants reported using did
not influence their decision-making. Consequently, this meta-analysis
suggests that individuals are not only holding false beliefs about valid
information for deception detection but are also not aware of their
inaccurate beliefs. Similarly, a meta-analysis lens model by Sporer and
Schwandt (2007) examined 12 non-verbal cues to deception, taken
from 54 studies. Only three of these cues (nodding, foot and leg
movements and hand movements) were found to be reliably associ-
ated with deception, whereas those most commonly believed to be
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associated with deception (adaptors, foot and leg movements and
illustrators) had either opposing or negligible effects, again suggesting
that individuals hold false beliefs about valid information for decep-
tion detection. However, these meta-analyses do not fit within the
traditional lens model approach. For a lens model analysis, all partici-
pants should be exposed to the same type of stimuli. In a meta-
analytic approach, there is great variability in participants' experiences,
stimulus material (e.g., written statements, videos or live interview)
and study methodology.
Research is yet to examine beliefs about the consistency heuristic
and veracity judgements using a lens model approach. In the current
research, we examined how much of the variance in veracity judg-
ments is explained by essential sources of information present in a
pair of statements, such as the level of detail and between-statement
consistency. Participants were asked to report their beliefs regarding
a variety of cues to deception, before making veracity judgements on
a series of statements and rating them for level of detail and consis-
tency. As not all judges interpret cues equally, and in turn, not all
statements contain all cues, using a within subjects repeated measures
design we account for the variance that is contributed by the judge
(i.e., a participants' personal beliefs about consistency and deception)
as well as the statement. Given the widely reported use of between-
statement consistency to inform veracity judgements (Granhag &
Strömwall, 2001; Masip et al., 2018; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003), it
was predicted that participants will use the consistency heuristic to
inform their credibility assessments. As such, participants' perception
of between-statement consistency will influence their veracity judge-
ments such that statements that are perceived to be higher in consis-
tency will be rated significantly more truthful than statements that are
lower in consistency (Hypothesis 1). As research shows that truth
tellers provide more details than liars (DePaulo et al., 2003), it is
predicted that statements that are perceived as more detailed will be
rated as more truthful than statements that are lower in detail
(Hypothesis 2). We also predicted that statements that are perceived
to be higher in terms of both between-statement consistency and
detail will be considered significantly more truthful than statements
that are perceived to be lower in between-statement consistency and
lower in detail (Hypothesis 3). It was anticipated that participants will
prioritise the consistency heuristic in their veracity decision-making,
as it is a more commonly reported perceived cue to deception than
amount of detail. As such we predict that statements that are per-
ceived to be higher in between-statement consistency and lower in
detail will be considered significantly more truthful than statements
that are perceived lower in between-statement consistency and
higher in detail (Hypothesis 4). As participants can interpret the same
cues in different ways (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000), we predicted
there will be variability in veracity ratings. We propose this variability
will be greater accounted for by individual factors of the participant
rating the statement rather than by level of detail and level of consis-
tency between statements (Hypothesis 5). However, as the effect of
individual factors of the participant and the influence of the statement
cannot be empirically compared, we report the SD of the statement
and participant intercepts separately in the model.
1 | METHOD
1.1 | Participants
We recruited 285 participants (48 male, 230 female, 6 non-binary,
1 preferred not to say, aged 21–75 years, Mage = 40.48 years,
SDage = 12.43) to complete an online questionnaire using social media.
In total, 772 participants clicked on the survey link, but due to incom-
plete data (as per pre-registration, completion of the questionnaire
was a requirement to include data for analysis, osf.io/vqga4), a final
sample of 285 (36.81%) were retained for analysis. Our cessation of
data collection rule was that the questionnaire would be taken offline
on the Friday after a minimum of 120 participants had completed
it. This sample was based upon a priori power calculations indicating
that for the study to detect a medium effect size (r = .30) with high
power (.90), given alpha = .05, a minimum of 112 participants were
required.
1.2 | Design
This study used a within-subjects design, where participants reported
their beliefs about cues to deception as well as their judgments of four
statements for perception of: veracity, amount of detail, consistency,
number of repetitions, number of omissions, number of reminiscences,
number of contradictions and confidence for their veracity judgement.
To explore whether laypeople consider consistency in the same way
as expert coders, participants provided an overall rating of between-
statement consistency as well as ratings of the four factors of consis-
tency identified by Fisher et al. (2013).
1.3 | Materials
1.3.1 | Beliefs questionnaire
Participants completed a short 20-item questionnaire regarding their
beliefs about cues to deception, including six critical questions
(regarding detail, consistency, repetitions, omissions, reminiscences
and contradictions) and 14 foil questions. The foil questions con-
cerned individuals' beliefs in other identified cues to deception, taken
from Reality Monitoring criteria (Sporer & Sharman, 2006), verifiability
approach (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014) and a meta-analysis regarding
cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). We included foil questions
to prevent participants identifying that consistency and detail were
the focus of the questionnaire, and do not analyse these beliefs as
they are not relevant to our research questions. Participants were
asked to rate the cues with respect to how much they believed they
were useful cues for determining veracity. Each cue was presented as
a statement (e.g., ‘Statements that contain unexpected complications’)
and was rated on an 11-point Likert scale where 0% represented a
strong cue to honesty, 50% was neutral, and 100% represented a
strong cue to deception. Question order was randomised to reduce
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order effects, and the beliefs questionnaire took approximately
3 minutes to complete. A copy of the beliefs questionnaire is available
at osf.io/ambcf/.
1.3.2 | Personality questionnaire
An exploratory component of this study was the inclusion of a per-
sonality measure. Participants were asked to complete a short person-
ality questionnaire (HEXACO-60, Ashton & Lee, 2009) as a filler task
between reporting their beliefs about cues to deception and making
their veracity judgements. The HEXACO-60 is a well-established tool
consisting of 60 questions measuring Honesty-Humility (H, here
Mcdonald's ω = .72), Emotionality (E, ω = .79), Extraversion
(X, ω = .85), Agreeableness (A, ω = .78), Conscientiousness (C, ω = .75)
and Openness to Experience (O, ω = .75). The HEXACO-60 question-
naire took approximately 12 minutes to complete.
1.3.3 | Rated statements
To generate statements for rating, 17 individuals (6 male, 11 female,
aged 18–52, Mage = 28.44, SDage = 9.35) were randomly allocated to
either telling the truth or lying about a memorable event that took
place in the past 2 years. They were interviewed by an instruction-
blind interviewer. Truth tellers were asked to recall a positive memo-
rable event that occurred within the past 2 years, and were given
examples such as of going on holiday or having a celebratory birthday
dinner. They were instructed to choose an event that they were com-
fortable talking about honestly and could remember in detail. Those
who were asked to lie were asked to invent the details of a positive
memorable event provided by the researcher (e.g., ‘Spending Christ-
mas on a beach’). Following a delay of 1 week, all participants ret-
urned to be interviewed by the same interviewer for a second time.
Participants were either truthful in both interviews or deceptive in
both interviews. Interviews were audio recorded and conducted using
a standardised script, featuring one open-ended request for the inter-
viewee to tell the interviewer everything about their memorable
event. The transcripts were then used as stimulus materials within the
subsequent online questionnaire.
The memorable event interviews were transcribed and coded for
detail and between-statement consistency. Each interview transcript
was first coded for number of details provided. (e.g., ‘on Christmas
day itself we went for a walk on the beach which was sandy and
freezing cold’. would contain five details; ‘sandy’, ‘freezing cold’, ‘walk’,
‘Christmas day’ and ‘beach’). Details were only counted the first time
they were mentioned for each account. For both truth tellers and liars,
the details provided in their second accounts were compared with
those provided in their first accounts, and categorised as the elements
of consistency (specified as ‘repetition’, ‘omission’, ‘reminiscent’ and
‘contradiction’, as described by Fisher et al., 2013). Repetitions were
details reported in both phases of the interview, omissions were
details reported in the first phase but not in the second phase of the
interviews, reminiscent details were details reported in the second
phase but not in the first phase of the interviews, and contradictions
were details reported in the first phase that were reported differently
in the second phase. A subset of four interviews (25%) were coded by
a second researcher, who was blind to the experimental conditions.
The inter-rater reliability between the coders was high for details in
the first accounts (intra-class correlation coefficient [ICC] = .96) and
detail in the second accounts (ICC = .98). High reliability was also
found across the two coders for repetitions (ICC = .98), reminiscences
(ICC = .95), contradictions (ICC = .88) and omissions (ICC = .89). There
were no significant differences between truth teller and liar state-
ments for the amount of detail provided, or any of the factors of con-
sistency, all t‘s < .81, all p's > .43.
For the online questionnaire, we used the first 16 sets of the
paired statements, and disregarded the statements provided by the
17th participant. Participants were shown pairs of statements so that
they could compare the details provided at time one to the details at
time two to assess between-statement consistency. We chose not to
include the 17th pair of statements, to ensure an even number of
paired statements were used. This meant that an equal number of
truth teller and liar statements could be presented. However, each
participant viewed a different combination of four of the paired state-
ments drawn randomly from the pool of 16 paired statements. Thus,
all 16 pairs of statements were viewed across the sample, but in dif-
ferent combinations of four per participant, in order to minimise order
effects. Participants were required to make one binary veracity deci-
sion for each pair of statements they read (truthful or lie) and rate
their confidence in their decision on an 11-point Likert scale (where
0% is low confidence and 100% is high confidence). In addition, the
pair of statements were rated on an 11-point Likert scale (where 0%
is low, 50% is average, and 100% is high) for the perceived amount of
detail, consistency between the statements, number of repetitions,
number of omitted details, number of reminiscent details and number
of contradictions. Participants were provided with the definitions for
repetitions, omissions, reminiscences and contradictions (e.g., [Please
rate the following statements for] ‘number of repetitions [i.e., how
much information is repeated from statement 1 to statement 2?]’,
‘number of omitted details [i.e., how much information is reported in
statement 1 but NOT in statement 2]’, ‘number of reminiscent details
[i.e., how much information is reported in statement 2 but NOT in
statement 1]’, and ‘number of contradictions [i.e., how much informa-
tion in one statement opposes information in the other statement?]’).
Completing the ratings for four sets of paired statements took on
average around 15 minutes to complete.
1.4 | Procedure
Participants were first presented with the 20-item questionnaire
regarding their beliefs about cues to deception. Questions were pres-
ented one at a time and in a random order. Following this, participants
completed the HEXACO-60 as a filler task, before moving on to the
veracity judgement task. Participants were each asked to read a
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different selection of four randomly selected pairs of statements from
the bank of 16 sets of paired statements. Participants were informed
that each pair of statements was taken from the same individual
1 week apart, and that the individual may be lying in both statements
or telling the truth in both statements about their experience. Partici-
pants were asked to read each pair of statements and select whether
they believed the pair of statements were an honest or deceptive
report, and provide a confidence rating for their judgement. They
were then asked to rate the statement with respect to the amount of
detail, consistency between the statements, number of repetitions,
number of omitted details, number of reminiscent details and number
of contradictions, which were sequentially presented below the state-
ment pairs, and in a randomised order. Participants were informed
that all of the rating variables were of equal importance, and as a
statement evaluator, they needed to look for each of the qualities in
the statements.
Once the ratings for all four paired statements were completed,
participants were debriefed and thanked for their time. Data was col-
lected using online survey platform Qualtrics, and in total took
approximately 30 minutes to complete.
1.5 | Analysis
The statistical tests used in this study (linear mixed effects modelling)
as well as the overall analytic framework (lens modelling) and are not
widely used in the deception detection literature. However, both offer
important insight into the way participants engage with studies like
ours and we outline these techniques in more detail here.
Linear mixed effects modelling (using ‘lme4’ for R; Bates, Mächler,
Bolker, & Walker, 2015) is an extension of standard regression tech-
niques for repeated measures data. Whereas standard regression
allows one x and one y value per data point, and thus requires aggre-
gating multiple trials or multiple participants for analysis, linear mixed
effects modelling can analyse all of the data collected in the study. It
does this by computing individual regression intercept and slopes
values for so-called ‘random’ factors. Random factors are quantified
sources of potential variance beyond the factors that we have manip-
ulated (which are known as ‘fixed factors’). Here, both the 16 state-
ments and the 285 participants are sampled from a wider theoretical
total population of possible participants and possible statements and
could explain variance in our results. As such the statements and the
participants are random factors. Our allocation of statements to being
truthful or deceptive is an experimental manipulation and a ‘fixed fac-
tor’ in our design. Linear mixed models, much like standard regression,
will allow us to see how participant ratings predict our fixed factor of
statement condition and will additionally report how much variance in
this effect is explained by our random factors.
We will use these models to evaluate the relationship between
participant judgments and statement qualities. So we will first investi-
gate the relationship between participant and expert coding of state-
ment features, such as repetitions or omission, whilst controlling for
random participant and statement factors. When we report linear
mixed effects models in the article, we report the unstandardised
overall sample slope (the ‘estimate’ in Table 2 or ‘β = .xx’ in text) with
95% CI of that effect (‘[.xx, .xx]’), a p-value and the standard deviation
of participant-level slopes (‘SD = .xx’). An effect with a larger SD of
slopes suggests more variability in the overall effect at the participant
level than an effect with a smaller SD of slopes.
Second, we will use linear mixed models in a ‘lens model’ frame-
work to understand the relationship between participant binary judg-
ments of veracity, statement veracity and participant coded cues. A
lens model framework allows us to test the ‘achievement’ of partici-
pant veracity judgments at detecting statement veracity and explore
how participants' use of the cues they coded (i) influence their verac-
ity judgment and (ii) detect the veracity condition of the statements.
Lens modelling is distinct to mediation analysis approaches as there is
reasonable expectancy that the potential cues are not all correlated
with judgments or statement veracity. Whilst it is possible that some
cues relate to both participants' judgments and statements (a ‘useful
cue’), it is also expected that some of the coded cues relate to neither
(a ‘useless cue’), some coded cues may relate to statement veracity
but not judgments (a ‘missed cue’) or some coded cues may influence
judgment but not relate to veracity (a ‘red herring’). Lens modelling is
often presented graphically to show the effects most efficiently.
Lens models can show which cues participants are using without
having to ask participants the overt questions ‘what criterion
influenced your judgment?’ as participants may not be aware. By tak-
ing advantage of the questionnaires in this study and the extraction of
participant-level regression slopes from the linear mixed effects analy-
sis, we can investigate the extent to which a participant reports the
importance of a cue on their judgment (i.e., ‘omissions are 100% a
strong cue to deception’) and the relationship between the cue and
their judgments (i.e., participant 1's omission-judgment relationship
was only β = .10). We can then correlate participant slopes with their
self-reported cue usage.
Similarly, correlations will be used to explain the relationship
between variance in HEXACO personality and variance in participant-
level slopes for the detecting statement veracity with veracity judg-
ments (participant ‘accuracy’).
Due to the number of tests run in this study, we correct our alpha
level so that we only report tests meeting a conservative criteria of
p < .005 as statistically significant throughout. All our code for analy-
sis can be found at osf.io/nd8ke/, and data is available at osf.io/
a2yxq/ and osf.io/39qby/.
2 | RESULTS
2.1 | Expert-participant agreement on cues
To establish whether laypeople interpreted statements in the same
way expert coders are trained to, we examined a linear mixed effects
model (Table 1). We found that participants' ratings of details con-
curred with those given by expert coders for the first account and the
second account. To a lesser extent, participants agreed with expert
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coders about the number of reminiscences. There was no such agree-
ment between participants and expert coders for omissions, contra-
dictions or repetitions.
2.2 | Veracity cue perception and judgements
We explored whether participants' perceptions of between-statement
consistency influenced their veracity judgements, and whether these
perceptions of consistency were accurate in identifying truthful or
deceptive statements. Participants were accurate in identifying state-
ment veracity 50.88% of the time, and accurate in identifying truthful
statements 65.63% of the time. First, we discuss the relationship
between participants' ratings of the statements and their binary judg-
ment of veracity. Full linear mixed effects models are reported in
Table 2. We found that when participants rated statements as more
detailed, they were more likely to consider statements as truthful,
supporting Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, when participants rated state-
ments as more consistent, they were significantly more likely to con-
sider statements as truthful (see Table 2), supporting Hypothesis 2. In
addition, fewer contradictions, fewer omissions, and more repetitions
were significantly more likely to influence veracity perceptions to be
truthful (all p < .001, see Table 2 and Figure 1). The relationship
between participant ratings of reminiscence and veracity judgments
did not meet our adjusted alpha level (p < .005) as p = .019. No inter-
action was found between consistency and detail, (β = .20 [−0.10,
0.42], p = .062, SD = 0.41), and as such no support was found for
Hypotheses 3 and 4.
On the other side of the lens (see left of Figure 1, Table 2), we
investigated how participant ratings of cues could be used to predict
the veracity of the statements. Higher participant ratings of the cate-
gory of consistency did predict honest statements, p < .001, however,
none of their judgements of the four factors of consistency and the
amount of detail were predictive of the veracity condition, all
p's ≥ .937.
The participants' veracity judgments did not predict statement
veracity (β = .03 [−0.96, 1.03], p = .948, SD = 0.32), with the SD inter-
cept for participant influence = 0.09, and the SD for the statement
influence = .47. However, the effect of the statement was notably het-
erogenous (SD = 0.47) suggesting that there were statements which
participants were reasonably accurate about, and statements that indi-
viduals were reasonably inaccurate about. The effect of participants
was smaller (SD = 0.09), and so no support is found for Hypothesis 5.
2.3 | Actual and self-reported cue usage
We next investigated the relationship between self-reported cue
influence and the extracted participant-level slopes of cue usage
(i.e., their actual use of the cue, see the right-hand side of Figure 1) to
explore whether participants were utilising the cues they report as
being important to the decision-making process. A significant negative
correlation was found between the participants self-reported utility of
cues, and participants actual use of cues for reminiscence, r
(283) = −.17, [−.38, −.06], p = .003. No correlation was found
TABLE 1 Expert-participant agreement on cues
Estimate [95% CI] p SD
First account 0.51 [0.34, 0.68] <.001* 0.01
Second account 0.54 [0.40, 0.69] <.001* 0.02
Reminiscences 0.34 [0.16, 0.52] .002* 0.17
Omissions 0.25 [0.01, 0.50] .063 0.04
Contradictions 0.32 [0.11, 0.53] .009 0.05
Repetitions 0.21 [0.01, 0.43] .088 0.01
*indicates statistical significance at p <.005.
TABLE 2 Full report of linear mixed effects models
Cue Estimate [95% CI] p
Random effect of
participant ratings
Random effect of
participant slopes
Random effect of
statement effects
Cue effects predicting rater veracity judgements (truth coded as +0.5 and deception coded as −0.5)
Details 0.55 [0.35, 0.74] <.001 0.00 0.54 0.93
Holistic consistency 2.47 [1.97, 2.96] <.001 0.66 1.39 0.51
Contradictions −1.49 [−1.78, −1.20] <.001 0.48 0.48 0.61
Omissions −0.60 [−0.80, −0.41] <.001 0.24 0.30 0.83
Repetitions 1.25 [0.95, 1.54] <.001 0.25 0.85 0.74
Reminiscences −0.21 [−0.38, −0.04] .019 0.27 0.49 1.03
Cue effects predicting statement veracity condition (truth coded as +0.5 and deception coded as −0.5)
Details −0.02 [−3.87, 3.82] .991 95.87
Holistic consistency 0.11 [0.11, 0.12] <.001 101.10
Contradictions −0.10 [−3.88, 3.67] .958 95.81
Omissions −0.01 [−3.77, 3.76] .997 95.87
Repetitions 0.12 [−3.54, 3.78] .949 95.79
Reminiscences −0.15 [−3.84, 3.55] .937 95.74
6 HUDSON ET AL.
between self-reported utility and actual use for amount of detail, r
(283) = −.03, [−.15, .09], p = .612, consistency, r(283) = −.13, [−.24,
−.02], p = .026, contradictions, r(283) = −.04, [−.16, .08], p = .504,
omissions, r(283) = .06 [−.05, .18], p = .283, or repetitions, r
(283) = −.04 [−.15, .07], p = .470. In other words, participants did not
show insight into which features of statements they were using to
form veracity judgments.
We also examined correlations between participants' holistic con-
sistency judgements, and their ratings of the four components of con-
sistency. A strong positive correlation was found between the
perception of consistency and the perceived number of repetitions,
r = .64 [.61, .68], p < .001. We also found a strong negative correlation
between the perception of consistency and the perceived number of
contradictions, r = −.73 [−.75, −.70], p < .001, and a moderate negative
correlation between the perception of consistency and the perceived
number of omissions, r = −.46 [−.50, −.41], p < .001. Finally, a weak
correlation was found between the perception of consistency and the
perceived number of reminiscent detail, r = −.20 [−.25, −.14], p < .001.
2.4 | Personality of perception of deception
We conducted exploratory analyses to look at participant HEXACO
personality traits and accuracy of veracity judgements to identify
whether there was a difference between the personality traits of those
who were accurate and inaccurate in their veracity judgements. There
were no notable correlations between participant personality traits and
accuracy of veracity judgements (all absolute r ≤ .14, all p ≥ .02).
3 | DISCUSSION
We examined the relationship between participants' perceptions of
between-statement consistency, their perceptions of four components
of consistency (repetitions, omissions, reminiscences and contradictions),
and their veracity judgements. This research addressed three main ques-
tions. First, we wanted to establish whether laypeople would interpret
statements in the same way as trained expert coders. The four compo-
nents of consistencywere operationalised by expert coders, and the par-
ticipants' rating of the components were compared with this. We
operationalised between-statement consistency using expert coders, as
this is how consistency is commonly determined and empirically tested
within a research setting.We found that while participants reported per-
ceiving the same amount of overall detail and reminiscent detail in a
statement as the expert coders, they did not agree on the amount of
omission, repetition or contradiction. This would suggest that expert
coders and laypeople are not relying on the same cues when they assess
between-statement consistency across multiple statements. Therefore,
research reporting the behaviours of experts who code statements for
between-statement consistency in detail, with dedicated time and
resources, may not examine the same behaviour as novices trying to
identify ‘consistency’ for the first time. In this research, participants'
holistic consistency judgements accurately predicted the veracity condi-
tion of a statement, but did not seem to relate to the components of con-
sistency. It is therefore important for future research to more precisely
delineatewhat ismeant by participantswhen they report utilising consis-
tency to inform their veracity judgements.
Second, we explored whether participants' perceptions of between-
statement consistency influenced their veracity judgements, and
whether these perceptions of consistency were accurate in identifying
truthful or deceptive statements. We found that perception of amount
of detail, holistic consistency, contradictions, omissions and repetitions
all significantly contributed to the veracity judgement, however, the per-
ception of reminiscence did not. Greater holistic consistency increased
the likelihood of truthful judgements (although there was a large amount
of variance in how this cue was interpreted), as would be suggested by
the consistency heuristic. In line with the consistency heuristic and the
subcomponents of consistency identified by Fisher et al. (2013), greater
F IGURE 1 Lens model representing the effects of participant ratings of cues on veracity judgement (right-hand side) and veracity condition
(left-hand side). Bold lines signify p < .001, dotted lines are not significant. See Table 2 for values
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amounts of repetition (an increase in consistency) led to more truthful
judgements, and was positively correlated with participants' holistic per-
ceptions of consistency. Conversely, greater amounts of omission and
contradiction (a decrease in consistency) led to more judgements of
deception, and both componentswere negatively correlatedwith partici-
pants' holistic perceptions of consistency. Reminiscence was not used in
the formation of veracity judgements and had the weakest correlation
with holistic consistency, which may be due to reminiscence being prev-
alent across truth tellers repeated accounts (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006).
Participants did not make accurate veracity judgements about the
statements, with an average accuracy rate of 50.88%, however, there
was a large amount of variance at the statement-level. This variance
indicates that whilst participants may have been reliably accurate or
inaccurate in their veracity judgements across certain statements
(truthful statements were accurately identified 65.63% of the time),
there were also statements where participants judgements varied,
suggesting that perception of more ambiguous statements differ from
person to person. No notable correlations were found between indi-
viduals' personalities and their judgement accuracy. These findings are
in line with Wissing and Reinhard (2017), who found no relationship
between dark and maladaptive personality traits and lie detection
accuracy. Future research would benefit from establishing which indi-
vidual differences influence veracity judgements, and how accurate
judges differ from inaccurate judges.
Finally, we were interested in whether participants used the cues
they reported as being important to the decision-making process. There
is a possibility that extraneous cues that were not examined informed
participants' veracity judgements, and that the cues examined in the cur-
rent research simply correlate with these extraneous cues. We therefore
interpret the following resultswith caution. A significant negative correla-
tion was found between participants' self-reported use and actual use of
reminiscence, however, no other correlations between self-reported use
and actual use were found. This suggests that although participants
reported using reminiscence in their judgement-making, they displayed
no evidence of this when completing their statement ratings. It is possible
that the reminiscence could simply be a correlate of deception judge-
ments, as opposed to being the cause of the deception judgements
(despite it being self-reported as useful). Regardless, this discrepancy sug-
gests a poor level of introspection for identifying the features of the state-
ments used to make veracity judgements, and therefore a lack of insight
regarding intended cue-usage. It is likely that individuals report a priori,
implicit causal theories for their behaviours (Nisbett &Wilson, 1977), and
therefore self-reported cue usage does not represent participants actual
cue usage. We opted to use real statements, in which the consistency
was not experimenter-manipulated in order to maximise ecological valid-
ity. Future research could benefit from using manufactured statements,
where the four components of consistency are deliberately manipulated
and all other features are held constant, to determine whether between-
statement consistency is used in veracity judgement-making.
There are a number of limitations to the current study, which may
have implications for the results. The online questionnaire took
around 30 minutes to finish, with only 37% of those who initially cli-
cked the survey link completing all questions. It is reasonable to
expect a level of fatigue and a biased sample for a voluntary online
study of this length. Participants were asked to make multiple ratings
of the same statements on different cues, which may have lowered
the attentiveness of participants and resulted in less discrimination in
cue perception. Statement presentation was randomised to statisti-
cally correct for this, however, the repeated nature of the task may
have influenced subsequent judgements, and therefore there it a
chance that cue perception altered across the task as a function of
fatigue. Future research could examine a detection-accuracy curve
when participants make multiple judgements, to establish whether
previous judgements influence future judgements.
Participantswere asked tomake binary ‘truthful’ or ‘deceptive’ judge-
ments about statements. However, it is possible that some participants
believed the statements contained embedded lies, and as such were nei-
ther fully truthful nor deceptive, but were forced tomake a choice. Partic-
ipants may have made different binary judgements based upon their own
biases. This study examined individual-level performance, and conse-
quently these biases would have been accounted for in the participants'
random slopes although it cannot be extrapolated from this dataset
where these biasesmay have influenced the decision-making process.
A large amount of deception occurs online over a number of
interactions in written format, such as internet scams, financial fraud
and online grooming. In this research, participants were asked to make
third-party veracity judgements based upon a written transcript of an
interaction. It stands to reason that the scale labels ‘low amount’,
‘average amount’ and ‘high amount’ are somewhat ambiguous and
could be interpreted differently without the social context of being
involved in the interaction. For instance, what is considered an aver-
age amount of detail in a statement may vary, dependent on the
sender and the context of the situation. Therefore, to establish what
the ‘average amount’ of anything is, based on a written transcript pro-
vided by a stranger with little surrounding context to the interaction,
is a challenging task, and can be considered a limitation of the design.
In conclusion, this research highlights several key points. Primar-
ily, there seems to be a discrepancy between how research explores
between-statement consistency and how it is understood by laypeo-
ple. Further to this, no notable correlations were found between self-
reported reliance on cues and actual usage of cues, and as such it
appears that individuals do not understand the cues they personally
use to make veracity decisions. Further exploration is needed to
establish what cues reliably influence veracity perceptions, and how
individuals vary in the decision-making process. The lens model high-
lights that perceptions of factors of consistency and amount of detail
directly influence the veracity judgement, however, these perceptions
are often inaccurate, and consequently, so are the veracity judge-
ments. A holistic perception of consistency could facilitate accurate
perceptions of veracity, however, it does not appear to be con-
ceptualised in the same way it is constructed by researchers.
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